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PROBATING INDIAN ESTATES: CONQUEROR'S
COURT VERSUS DECEDENT INTENT
Antonina Vaznelis*
This article presents an overview of Indian probate problems and
addresses the jurisdictional conflicts involved in probating the
estates of Indians who have an interest in federal trust property.
Basic differences in Indian and non-Indian concepts of owner-
ship formed the basis for many of today's problems. Fluctuating
federal policy, the transitory and mutable nature of tribal
powers, and past attempts to legislate Indian culture out of ex-
istence and Indian peoples into mainstream American society
helped to deepen the problems.
Roots of Contemporary Probate Issues
The Concept of Ownership
Before a European foot stepped on this continent, actual
ownership of the land was not an issue. Most nonagrarian Indian
tribes believed tilling the soil was a desecration. All Indians,
whether hunter or planter, considered the concept of individual
land ownership a religious sacrilege. The earth belonged to the
Great One. The idea of transferring real property interests by in-
heritance was nonexistent. Generally, personal property was
shared by tribal members under a system of communal owner-
ship.
The Indian tradition of community ownership contrasted
sharply with the European concept of individual ownership, a
carryover from feudal law. Initially, tribes were- permitted to re-
tain their traditional ways, but tolerance waned as non-Indian
land hunger grew. Tribes were pushed westward and the United
States government's Indian policy was shaped and reshaped. As
is the case today, federal policy was based as much on non-Indian
desires as on Indian needs. The trend to view tribal sovereignty as
a philosophical ideal, rather than a political reality, began shortly
after the Revolutionary War, when Indian soldiers and scouts
were no longer needed to fight the British. Settlers wanted more
and more Indian land as time went by.
* B.A. 1976, UCLA; J.D. 1983, Southwestern Univ. and Univ. of Montana.
Clerk, Montana Supreme Court, for Justice Fred J. Weber.
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The Pendulum of Federal Indian Policy
From 1830 to 1860, Indian tribes endured the removal era.'
Forced from their traditional homelands, some tribes migrated
far from their ancestral lands. Others traveled to federally
designated areas in the western United States. The assimilationist
period encompassed 1860 to 1934, when federal policy encour-
aged Indians to adopt the dominant culture's customs and to
assimilate into mainstream American society.2 Federally spon-
sored training and educational programs were initiated, and
native traditions were rigorously discouraged.' The federal gov-
ernment also attempted to discourage the traditional Indian con-
cept of tribal ownership of property by allotting "tribal land" to
individual Indians. In 1934 federal policy shifted back toward the
concept of tribal sovereignty with passage of the Indian Reorgan-
ization Act, which proposed to give tribes more freedom of self-
government. Between 1950 and the mid-1960s, the federal gov-
ernment attempted to terminate its special relationship with the
tribes by terminating federal recognition of certain tribes as en-
tities." In 1968 the Indian Civil Rights Act was passed, marking a
return to federal respect for tribal self-government so long as in-
dividual Indians were assured most of the same protections that
non-Indian citizens enjoyed under the Bill of Rights.' The Indian
Self-Determination Act of 1975 established statutory authority
for provision of necessary services to members through tribal,
rather than governmental, programs.
6
Federal Indian policy has shifted with the prevailing winds of
public sentiment and national politics. The pendulum of federal
1. G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL (1932).
2. H. FRiTz, THE MOVEMENT FOR INDIAN ASSIMILATION: 1860-1890 (1963).
3. The Wounded Knee massacre of 1890 is an extreme example of the effects of this
assimilationist policy. U.S. Seventh Cavalry troops, preoccupied with stifling a native
religious practice known as the Ghost Dance, killed 146 Sioux Indians-men, women, and
children.
4. Wilkinson & Biggs, Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
139 (1977); J. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953); W. CANBY,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 50 (1981).
5. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C.A.§§ 1301-1341 (1983).
6. The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25
U.S.C.A. §§ 450a-450n (1983), gave express authority to the secretaries of Interior and
Health, Education and Welfare to make grants directly to and contract with Indian tribes
and organizations for delivery of federal services. Tribal programs are to be funded by
the federal government, but planned and administered by the tribes themselves. See D.
GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 110-11 (1979).
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policy has never been still, but the central issue in Indian law to-
day is the same issue that dominated debate in the 1800s: "Who
governs the land, the resources, and the people?" 7
Tribal Sovereignty
In Worcester v. Georgia,' United States Supreme Court Justice
Marshall rested federal recognition of tribal sovereignty on "two
basic principles of the tribal state relation ... federal preemption
of state control over Indian affairs and tribal political in-
dependence.' 9 The federal government intended to protect tribes
from state interference and to uphold the tribes' inherent and
unextinguished powers.
This view was conditionally reasserted by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Wheeler"0 :
The powers of Indian tribes are, in general, "inherent powers of
a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."...
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and
limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress
and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts,
the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn
by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status. 1
In order for a tribe to exercise its "limited sovereignty" and
right to tribal self-government, it must have the power to govern
both its members and its territory. These two necessary com-
ponents of self-government were recognized in Wheeler: "Indian
tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty
over both their members and their territory."'" Indian probate
problems clearly illustrate that simply "possessing attributes of
sovereignty" is a far cry from having sovereign control over
members and property located within tribal territory.
"Within reservations, the tribes have plenary, direct, and ex-
7. GETCHES, ROSENFELT & WILKINSON, supra note 5, at 348.
8. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
9. McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty: Accommodating Tribal, State and
Federal Interest, 13 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIE. L. REv. 357, 377 (1978).
10. 435 U.S. 313 (1978), citing F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 122 (1945).
11. Id. at 322-23.
12. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978), citing United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
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clusive authority over members except when expressly limited by
federal law." 13 This should also be the rule regarding authority
over members' property located within the reservation. In this
area, limitations are clear because the federal government has
assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the descent and partition of
all Indian trust property.1 4 Federal agents have the power to
determine heirs and to disapprove wills made by Indians." When
an Indian dies intestate or having made a holographic will and
trust property is part of the estate, federal agents have the power
to determine the beneficiaries of the Indian estate. Generally, in
the past, nontrust property was distributed by the federal admin-
istrative law judge at the same time the trust interest was trans-
ferred. In such a practice, decedent's intent might be considered
secondary to the Indian agent's determination of heirs. As tribes
assert their powers of self-government and jurisdiction to probate
Indian estates, these practices are rightfully eliminated.
One manner in which tribes can assert their power of self-
government is to establish tribal court jurisdiction over that por-
tion of a decedent's estate which consists of nontrust assets. Cur-
rent federal policy seems supportive of such a move.
Present federal policy appears to be returning to a focus upon
strengthening tribal self-government [citations omitted] and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has expressed the view
that courts "are not obliged in ambiguous instances" to strain
to implement [an assimilationist] policy Congress has now re-
jected, particularly where to do so would interfere with the pre-
sent congressional approach to what is, after all, an ongoing
relationship. 16
Allotment
The concept of tribal sovereignty, as stated by Justice Mar-
shall, was tempered by growing assimilationism during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Based primarily on
popular resentment and belief that white settlers were being ex-
13. Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L.
REv. 479, 518 (1979).
14. 25 U.S.C.A. § 348 (1983).
15. 43 C.F.R. § 4.203 (1982).
16. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 389 n.14 (1976), citing Santa Rosa Band
of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 663 (1975).
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cluded from large tracts of reserved land, Congress passed the
General Allotment Act of 1887.17
Prompted by a desire to "civilize" the Indian, the government
began, in 1887, to grant fee title to individual tribes' members.
Some 51/2 million acres of reservation land were allotted to in-
dividual Indians in the first 15 years of the program. To pre-
vent Indians unskilled in landowning from being defrauded of
their tracts, titles were disabled by a total restraint against
alienation, except by special permission of the Government.
When an owner died, the land was divided among the heirs ac-
cording to federal statutes, which provided for distributing the
land according to state rules of intestate succession if no will
had been made, and setting aside a will if all the decedent's
family was not included. [Citations omitted.] The practical ef-
fect of these policies was progressive fractionation of owner-
ship of the land, so that now over half the reservation
allotments are held by so many owners in common that the In-
dians are helpless to make effective use of their property.
Unless this pattern can be reversed, all Indian allotments in-
evitably will have an astronomical number of owners."
Under the Allotment Act, title to each allotment was to be held
in trust by the United States government for twenty-five years.
Although the original twenty-five-year trust term was indefinitely
extended 9 and restraints against alienation remain, trust property
has been sold with the federal trustee's special permission.
In 1887 there were 138 million acres of reservation area. Today
there are less than 48 million acres, some 20 million of which is
desert or semidesert.20 Several commentators attribute white
greed as the sole reason for this incredible land loss, noting that
"Indian land is cheaper, easier and less politically dangerous to
take."" "Construction engineers, road builders and dam erectors
17. The General Allotment Act is also known as the Dawes Act, 24 Stat. 388. Its ef-
fect upon the Indian population has been nothing short of disastrous.
18. Williams, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs: The Indian Heirship Problem, 46
WASH. L. REv. 709, 710-11 (1971).
19. The General Allotment Act of 1887 gave the president discretion to extend the
trust period, which was done repeatedly. The Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-
Howard) of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 462, extended all Indian trust periods indefinitely.
20. STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES, table 387, at 229 (U.S.B.I.A.
1982-83). See also CANBY, supra note 4, at 21.
21. Williams, supra note 18, at 720 n.50, citing E. CAHN, OUR BROTHER'S KEEPER:
THE INDIAN IN WHITE AMERICA 69, 73 (1969). See also V. DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR
YOUR SINS (1969).
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have an uncanny knack for discovering that the only feasible and
economical way to do what must be done will, unfortunately,
necessitate taking the Indian's land." 2" This tendency holds true
for Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) grants of right-of-way across
Indian land as well.23 With federal approval and often encourage-
ment, sales are consummated between low-income Indian families
and non-Indians with the necessary assets to put good grazing
land, farmland, and mineral- or timber-rich property to full
economic use. Many tribes sell their more valuable holdings as a
means of economic survival.
Most allotment schemes directly contemplated non-Indian set-
tlement within the reservation on what was deemed to be
"surplus" Indian land, and the resulting integration was an af-
firmative policy of the government . . . . Some allotment
schemes resulted in non-Indian ownership indirectly; Indian
allotments were made alienable and were subsequently acquired
by non-Indians . . . . [A]lienability was a deliberate policy of
the government. Furthermore, the allotment schemes presup-
posed the eventual withering away of the reservations and
tribal authority through assimilation of the Indians, a view that
was not abandoned until 1934.24
Abandonment of the assimilationist view did not alter the
Allotment Act's disastrous effects. In fact, through inheritance
and further division of allotment interests, those effects have
been exacerbated. The federal government's management of
allotted lands falls well short of the standard required of other
trustees. Its fiduciary duty toward the tribes and allottee members
seems more a matter of choice than an enforceable legal obliga-
tion.
In 1980 the Quinalt Reservation Indians filed suit alleging
breach of duty to manage timber on trust land.2" The tribe
asserted that the government had failed to obtain fair market
value in selling its trust assets (the timber), had failed to manage
22. CAHN, supra note 21, at 69. See the photograph, id. at 70, of the chairman of
the Fort Berthold Indian Tribal Business Council weeping over the 1948 forced sale of
155,000 acres of reservation land in North Dakota. The Army Corps of Engineers decided
it was necessary to flood one-fourth of the Three Affiliated Tribes' land in order to con-
struct the Garrison Lake and Reservoir Project.
23. Id. at 73.
24. Collins, supra note 13, at 506-07, citing Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
25. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
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the trust property in such a manner that the res would not be
diminished (lack of timber management), had failed to pay in-
terest on funds held by the trustee (income from timber sales),
and had exacted excessive administrative charges from the bene-
ficiaries (the tribe). The United States Supreme Court abstained
from addressing these specific charges, choosing instead to limit
its review to the meaning of the Allotment Act.
[W]hen Congress enacted the General Allotment Act, it in-
tended that the United States "hold the land ... in trust" not
because it wished the Government to control use of the land
and be subject to money damages for breaches of fiduciary
duty, but simply because it wished to prevent alienation of the
land and to ensure that allottees would be immune from state
taxation.26
The Supreme Court sidestepped the issue of whether the govern-
ment had, in fact, breached its fiduciary duty to the tribe. By par-
ticularizing the timber management issue, the Court limited the
scope of the government's fiduciary duty to such an extent that it
would be unrecognizable outside the field of Indian law. Assume
identical breaches of fiduciary responsibility, that the trust res
were real property other than allotted Indian land, and that the
beneficiaries were other than Indian allottees: Would any court
permit sale of trust property for less than market value, or con-
done failure to pay interest on funds held by a trustee? Would
any court refuse to address the issue of blatant mismanagement
by a trustee?
Where allotted trust lands are concerned, the government's
trust relationship extends to individual allottees as well as to the
tribe as a whole. Trustee power to protect trust property can be
used to thwart testamentary intent and to sell Indian land to the
highest bidder.
The BIA realty officer can thwart the Indian's wishes to will his
land to whomever he wants-first through his power to deter-
mine whether it is "efficient" for the land to be divided, and
secondly, through his power to affect the Bureau's determina-
tion of the validity of the will.
The BIA can rule that a deceased Indian was incompetent in
drawing his will, or that the will failed to make "adequate pro-
vision" for all the heirs. The Bureau refuses to define, or even
26. Id. at 544.
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provide guidance for, what constitutes "adequate provision."
Such rulings nullify the will and the land is often sold to the
highest bidder-usually a non-Indian.27
Multiple Heirship
The problem of mismanagement of trust land is only one facet
of the allotment problem. An Indian who inherits an allotment
interest is likely also to inherit problems with distant relatives.
Under present law, unanimous consent of the "owners" is re-
quired before allotments can be sold.2" Heirs may be
minors, recalcitrant, non compos mentis, or unavailable. Fric-
tions arise because Indians cannot understand how land in
which they have an equity can pass intestate to persons not im-
mediately related to them or only related by marriage, and this
misunderstanding compounds the difficulty in management of
their land.
Nor is partition of the allotments feasible in most cases, since
farmers cannot make economical use of a farm as small as 80
acres. The cost of partition is prohibitive unless the land is
valuable and all the owners solvent-a combination of cir-
cumstances seldom found on an Indian reservation.29
Leasing to non-Indians has become a common practice. "Over
27. CAHN, supra note 21, at 74.
28. 25 U.S.C.A. § 379 (1983) reads in part:
The adult heirs of any deceased Indian to whom a trust or other patent containing
restrictions upon alienation has been or shall be issued for lands allotted to him may
sell and convey the lands inherited from such decedent, but in case of minor heirs their
interests shall be sold only by a guardian duly appointed by the proper court upon the
order of such court . . . but all such conveyances shall be subject to the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior, and when so approved shall convey a full title to the pur-
chase. ...
25 U.S.C.A. § 404 reads in part:
The lands, or any part thereof, allotted to any Indian or any inherited interest therein,
which can be sold under existing law by authority of the Secretary of the Interior, ex-
cept the lands in Oklahoma and the States of Minnesota and South Dakota, may be
sold on the petition of the allottee, or his heirs, on such terms and conditions and
under such regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe ...
25 U.S.C.A. § 483 reads in part: "The Secretary of the Interior, or his duly authorized
representative, is authorized in his discretion, and upon application of the Indian owners,
to issue patents in fee, to remove restrictions against alienation, and to approve con-
veyances, with respect to lands or interests in lands held by individual Indians. . ....
29. Williams, supra note 18, at 714-15.
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half of the heirship land is now used by non-Indians because in-
dividual Indians cannot assemble sufficient acreage or credit to
make farming profitable and because it is simpler for the Bureau
of Indian Affairs to deal with operators who control large
tracts."" Where leasing to non-Indians has been commonplace,
it may be easier to rationalize eventual sales to non-Indians.
A Colville Indian, who testified before the House Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, explained the effect of multiple
heirship as follows:
My sister's allotment was 80 acres. She died and my dad, a
white man, was willed the land. He died and all his children fell
heir. His share was 13440/20160. We had that probated in
court-four children share is 960/20160, and cousins one share
270/20160, five shares 128/20160, one share 320/20160, one
share 140/20160, seven shares 35/20160 and these last seven are
no relation only that this man was once a brother-in-law and
they are the ones that won't sign so that we can have a hundred
percent signers. 1
The government has been aware of the multiple heirship problem
since publication of the Merriam Report in 1928.32 Noting wide-
spread poverty on the reservations and the fact that multiple heir-
ship was one of its causes, the federally requested report advised
the government to purchase heirship land. The problem of pov-
erty could only increase as ownership of the land was increasingly
fractionated generation after generation. The Commission's ad-
vice has never been followed and with each succesive generation
the effects of fractionation have multiplied at a rate beyond
geometric progression.
Suggested solutions have included limiting the number of heirs
permitted to inherit under federal law or setting up revolving
funds that would permit tribes to purchase allotment interests
from individual heirs. Had the trust land remained tribal land,
the heirship problem would not exist. The Merriam Report's
recommendation to provide tribes with funds to repurchase their
30. Id. at 712-13.
31. House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, Indian Heirship Land Study, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess., 463 (1960).
32. INST. FOR GOVT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928),
commonly known as the Merriam Report, documented the failure of the federal Indian
policy during the allotment era and the abject poverty in which most Indians were forced
to live.
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lost lands is the only suggested solution that would place tribes in
a position resembling the one they enjoyed before the Allotment
Act. Of course, land owned in fee by non-Indians is probably
unrecoverable. The alternative proposal for single descent could
not retroactively correct the multiple heirship problem. Such a
restriction very likely would interfere with testator intent, tribal
self-government, and minor children's right to support. As the
multiple heirship problem is perpetuated, the probate of Indian
estates becomes a more and more complex area of the law.
Wills and the Old Ways
Conditions previously foreign to Indian culture present prob-
lems. Most older Indians refuse to make wills because the prac-
tice conflicts with traditional values of communal sharing and in-
terdependency. Many younger Indians refuse to make wills
because they resent BIA involvement in their personal and family
affairs. Indication that this modern-day resentment is longstand-
ing can be found, for example, in the Crow Tribe's constitution
of 1948.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs, being a part of the United States
Government, shall in no wise interfere directly or indirectly
through its field representatives or agents with the deliberations
or decisions of the Crow Tribal Council. The council, existing
under the legal handicaps herein pointed out, belongs to the
Crow Tribe only and not the government, and as such will
make its decisions without Indian Bureau interference or ad-
vice, inasmuch as the Indian Bureau, under the broad powers
in Indian administration conferred upon the Congress ... and
the courts, can and does nullify Indian tribal council actions
the country over when same takes issue with its own views."
Standard BIA procedure for the drafting and approval of a
will is generally a five-step process. The would-be testator makes
an appointment to meet with a BIA employee to discuss the in-
tended distribution of his property. The BIA employee searches
agency records to determine all known heirs of the would-be
testator. A will is drafted, often typed on a Bureau form. The
tribal member is again called in to review the will and, upon ap-
proval, to sign in the presence of witnesses (generally two BIA
33. Constitution and Bylaws of the Crow Tribal Council, art. VII, 8, reprinted at
16-17, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS: THEIR PAST-THEIR FUTURE (1978).
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employees). The executed will is then sent by the agency
superintendent to the field solicitor's office for approval as to
form. In Montana agency superintendents on each of the seven
reservations send executed wills to the field solicitor's office in
Billings. If approved, the will is returned to the reservation
superintendent. The will is generally kept on file in the
superintendent's office until the testator's death. 4 The possibility
exists that the superintendent's determination of trust property
heirs and this federal imposition of a formal approval procedure
interfere with testator intent regarding nontrust property.
The intent of the author of a holographic will is no more pro-
tected than are the wishes of an allottee who dies intestate. In
both instances, a federal administrative law judge determines the
decedent's heirs, based on information furnished by the agency
superintendent.3 A holographic will that does not name every
heir of record will be disapproved, thus freeing the administrative
law judge and agency superintendent to proceed in distributing
property contrary to testator intent.
In Spriggs v. United States," the Tenth Circuit upheld a will
disposing of restricted land even though the will was approved
after the testator's death. However, post-demise approval of a
will is the exception rather than the rule. For instance, in Brown-
ing, Montana, Bureau policy is to invalidate any Blackfoot will
that has not been formally approved prior to the testator's
death." There is no federal regulatory authority validating the
Bureau's practice. The Code of Federal Regulations dictates the
manner in which wills are to be approved, but does not specify
the timing of such approval.
Upon an allottee's death, the agency superintendent supplies
the administrative law judge with information regarding heirship,
marriages and divorces, proof of death, creditors, decedent's pro-
perty, and the executed will, if one is on ffle.3 ' Within ninety days
of receipt of notice of death, probate of the allottee's estate is to
34. 43 C.F.R. § 4.260(b) (1982).
35. 43 C.F.R. § 4.202 (1982).
36. 297 F.2d 460 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876.
37. For example, the holographic 1973 will of Emery Dennis Juneau, Sr., a
Blackfoot tribal member who died in 1978, was invalidated for lack of formal approval
prior to death and lack of proper witness attestation, although the agency superintendent
had had custody of the will for approximately three years. In re Estate of Juneau, 7
I.B.I.A. 164 (1979).
38. 43 C.F.R. § 4.210 (1982).
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begin." The administrative law judge, who is a modern
equivalent to the frontier circuit judge, serves notice on all in-
terested parties and posts notice of the hearing in five or more
conspicuous places for at least twenty days.4 0 This federal notice
requirement may differ from state probate hearing notice re-
quirements.41 The minimum age at which an Indian may make a
will, twenty-one years, is another area of possible discrepancy
with state law. 2
The federal requirements for the making of wills, approval of
wills, probate of estates, and technical distinctions between re-
quirements placed on Indian estates and estates of other citizens
exist only by virtue of the federal government's exclusive jurisdic-
tion over allotted lands. 43 Although the original purpose of that
jurisdiction was to protect Indian lands from acquisition by non-
Indians, that purpose has failed. The tribal land base has been all
but decimated in the wake of the Allotment Act. Indian land con-
tinues to slip through the federal trustee's fingers, and today's
strong sentiment in favor of American energy development,
especially on public lands, may act to encourage further aliena-
tion of Indian lands.
Failure to appreciate the religious and cultural association of
the Indian with the tribal land has prevented understanding of
the depth of his resistance to further reduction of the reserva-
tion land base. Uniformly, Indians have a tradition of
naturalistic religion often rooted in particular tracts of land ....
Thus, the detrimental effects of land loss are not only economic,
but include a profound loss of identity on a tribal level. 44
Federal restrictions on trust property were imposed as a
response to a failed assimilationist policy. Perpetual federal
39. 43 C.F.R. § 4.210(b) (1982).
40. 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.211-.212 (1982). Note the regulations do not specify the timing of
notice, but merely advise that service be made "in sufficient time in advance to enable the
person served to attend."
41. E.g., see Mor. CODE ANN. § 72-1-301 (1983), which requires a 14-day notice
period.
42. 25 U.S.C.A. § 373 (1983) requires the allottee to be 21 years old; MoNT. CODE
ANN. § 72-2-301 (1983) permits "any person 18 or more years of age" to make a will.
43. 25 U.S.C.A. § 348 (1983).
44. Williams, supra note 18, at 719, citing C. RELANDER, STRANGERS ON THE LAND
56, 61 (1962); W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 4,
63 (1966); COHEN, supra note 10, at 208; DELORIA, supra note 21, at 103; Note, Indians:
Better Dead Than Red?, 42 So. CAL. L. REV. 101 (1968).
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jurisdiction seems as unlikely a solution to the clash of Indian and
non-Indian values as forced assimilation was.
Concurrent jurisdiction over Indian estates may mean many
fingers in the pie. Today when an Indian decedent owns personal
and/or real property, located both on and off the reservation, it is
possible for three separate forums to claim probate jurisdiction.
The administrative law judge exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
all property held in trust by the United States. The state asserts
jurisdiction over all real property located off the reservation. State
courts have also asserted at least concurrent jurisdiction over per-
sonal property located off the reservation or on a reservation other
than the one of which decedent was a member. The tribal court
may claim jurisdiction over all nontrust property, real and per-
sonal, owned by members within the reservation. Unless the tribal
code specifies how the tribal judge is to distribute decedent's non-
trust assets, probate generally occurs under the federal ad-
ministrative law judge's pendent jurisdiction during the probate of
federal trust property. In the past, many tribal codes have in-
dicated that state law is to govern in intestacy matters. Thus, one
estate may be affected by a hodgepodge of federal, state, and
tribal court procedures and laws.
Establishment of Tribal Courts
The Indian Reorganization Act of 193411 was enacted partly in
response to the Merriam Report and partly because of a realization
that tribes are not effectively assimilated against their will. The Act
allowed tribes to exercise some of the sovereignty they had always
been assured they possessed. Under the Act, tribes adopted con-
stitutions and bylaws, and they employed their own legal counsel.
For the first time since treaties were signed, the federal government
gave tribes a choice: whether to accept or reject coverage under the
Act. Several tribes "rejected coverage of the Act, fearing addi-
tional federal direction."" Many tribes chose to follow federal
suggestions in drafting their constitutions, instead of drafting
original documents reflecting their individual tribal traditions.
Tribal-State Conflict
Today there are at least 161 tribal courts in America and 270
45. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (Wheeler-Howard), 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 461-479
(1983).
46. CANBY, supra note 4, at 25.
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tribal judges." Federal adoption of a uniform tribal probate code
would fly in the face of tribal sovereignty and the right of self-
government. On the other hand, considering the highly in-
dividualized needs and goals of each tribe, voluntary adoption of
such a system is unlikely.48
States, of course, have an interest in the probate of their
citizens' estates. Tribal membership does not preclude state
citizenship. State interest in property located within the state on
decedent's date of death includes property owned by Indians.
State courts are often willing to probate Indian nontrust estates
under the theory of jurisdiction by default, i.e., where both the
federal and tribal court decline to assert jurisdiction over the mat-
ter. A leading Montana case, State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District
Court,"9 established a three-pronged test that can be used when
dealing with questions of state court jurisdiction over Indian mat-
ters:
Before a district court can assume jurisdiction in any matter
submitted to it, it must find subject matter jurisdiction by
determining: (1) whether the federal treaties and statutes
applicable have preempted state jurisdiction; (2) whether the
exercise of state jurisdiction would interfere with reservation
self-government; and (3) whether the Tribal Court is currently
exercising jurisdiction or has exercised jurisdiction in such a
manner as to preempt state jurisdiction.50
Generally, absent federal or tribal jurisdiction, the state court
may assume jurisdiction to fill the legal vacuum. The Iron Bear
test includes consideration of state interference with tribal self-
government and is not limited simply by assertion of jurisdiction
by another forum. Assertion of jurisdiction by another forum, or
by federal treaty rights, or by restrictive statutory language is only
part of the test. Jurisdiction over the probate of Indian estates
may also be disclaimed by state statute, either in a provision
defining civil court jurisdiction or by limiting language in the pro-
bate code. In many western states, language disclaiming jurisdic-
tion over Indian lands is also found in the enabling act of state
constitutions. State statutory impediments are overcome by the
47. Trends and Problems in Probate of Estates of Deceased Indian Tribal Members,
9 ABA PROBATE AND PROPERTY No. 16 (1981).
48. Id. at 17-19.
49. 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1291 (1973).
50. Id. at 346, 512 P.2d at 1299.
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fact that Indian tribal members are state citizens as well. Enabling
language in state constitutions prohibiting state jurisdiction over
Indians has been consistently ignored.
As a general rule of probate law, the nature and location of
decedent's property determines choice of law and primary
jurisdiction. When one state asserts subject matter jurisdiction
over property, the validity of a will and the administration of a
decedent's estate are governed by the law of the location of "im-
movables" and by the law of the decedent's domicile as to
"movables." However, when both tribes and states assert
jurisdiction over an Indian decedent's estate, the nature and loca-
tion of the property is only one factor in determining primary
jurisdiction. The extent to which the state is willing to recognize
tribal sovereignty is also a factor. When an Indian dies owning
property both on and off the reservation, tension between the
state and the tribe may occur. As a rule, state courts assume
jurisdiction over estates of Indians who die domiciled off-reserva-
tion and over estates of non-Indians domiciled in Indian country.
"It might well be argued that where a non-Indian dies domiciled
in Indian country and leaves Indian heirs, an exercise of state
jurisdiction has the potential of interfering with internal tribal af-
fairs.""sI This is also the case when a mixed estate, a common-law
spouse, adopted children, or mixed-blood kin are involved.
The tribal-state jurisdictional conflict is usually defused by
tribal court concession, i.e., refusal to assert exclusive jurisdic-
tion over members' probate matters. However, in instances where
the state court exercises ancillary or concurrent jurisdiction, tribal
courts could choose to assert their reserved powers. For example,
when an Indian dies domiciled on-reservation, owning nontrust
personal property located off-reservation, both state and tribal
courts may assert jurisdiction, but the tribal court could demand
jurisdiction over the entire nontrust estate of deceased members.
The direct source of tribal power to preempt concurrent state
jurisdiction is not constitutional in character. The source may
be defined as one of either "delegation" or "recognition."
The "delegation" perspective views tribal preemption as the
exercise of expressly or impliedly delegated federal power.
Under this view, the powers delegated to the Indians by Con-
gress may be considered the comprehensive federal action
51. CA.my, supra note 4, at 141.
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which preempts the states' jurisdiction over that subject mat-
ter. 2
In the past, tribal courts have been reticent about exerting con-
current, much less preemptive, jurisdiction even though state
courts have extended their jurisdiction onto the reservation. The
question of whether tribal court jurisdiction extends to members'
movable assets located off-reservation on decedent's date of
death has not been tested.
Under Williams v. Lee," state jurisdiction over nontrust per-
sonalty of a tribal member who dies on-reservation clearly seems
to violate a "significant tribal interest," i.e., tribal self-
government. "IT]he view that tribal self-government is limited by
territorial boundaries and tribal citizenship is inconsistent with
existing case law . . . . [The particular interests of tribes, states
and the federal government" must be balanced. 4
In Indian law, territorial and citizenship factors do not control
or furnish the forum with interest in applying its own laws. Tribal
interest is frequently based on custom, tradition, and a healthy
group desire for self-preservation. The state has an interest in the
orderly descent of property located within its borders and in pro-
tection of its citizens' rights. Nontribal judges, unfamiliar with
tribal tradition, often cannot intuit what a tribal judge might do
under the same set of circumstances. "It is only by recognizing
these interests that the courts can serve as effective tribunals for
resolving tribal-state and tribal-federal conflicts." ' , The United
States Supreme Court has noted that "the people of the States
where they [Indian tribes] are found are often their deadliest
enemies. ' ' , The Ninth Circuit has stated that: "The result, given
the fact that Indians and surrounding communities are often
likely to have differing views of. . .economic development, en-
vironmental amenity, public morals, and the like, is that there
may inevitably be some abrasion between Indian communities
52. Collins, supra note 13, at 640-41. See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544 (1975).
53. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
54. McCoy, supra note 9, at 389. "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress,
the question has always been whether state action infringed on the right of reservation In-
dians to make their own laws and be governed by them." Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
219-20 (1959). An example of tribal off-reservation regulatory powers is found in Settler
v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974) (Yakima Tribe was held to have regulatory power
over off-reservation fishing rights of tribal members).
55. McCoy, supra note 9, at 423.
56. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
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and local neighbors."" Clearly, each court has a duty to balance
all three interests (tribal, federal, and state) before probating
estates of deceased Indian tribal members. 8
Choice of Forum
United States constitutional authority, federal statutes, and
treaties are used to determine jurisdiction. Except where expressly
limited by federal law, tribes have plenary, direct, and exclusive
authority over members within the reservation. The guardianship
concept, with Indians as government wards, formed the basis for
exclusive federal jurisdiction over trust assets, whether the Indian
decedent was domiciled on or off the reservation at the time of
death. State court jurisdiction over Indian-owned land located
off the reservation is asserted regardless of the Indian decedent's
domicile. 9 State courts also assert exclusive jurisdiction over all
assets owned by non-Indians, even those located within Indian
country.
Jurisdiction concerning movables is the grey area of Indian
probate law. The established rule has been that movables owned
by an Indian who dies on-reservation fall within the tribal court's
primary jurisdiction. If he died off-reservation, the state had pri-
mary jurisdiction, but the tribe could assert concurrent jurisdic-
tion over any on-reservation property. The case of Estate of
Standing Bear v. Belcourt6" has clouded this rule.
Douglas J. Standing Bear, a Wyoming Arapaho member of the
Wind River Reservation, lived on the Rocky Boy's Reservation
with his wife and adopted daughter, both of whom were members
of the Chippewa-Cree Tribe of Montana. On the date of his
death, decedent owned a grader that was located on another
reservation. Standing Bear's widow moved the grader to her
reservation and petitioned state court for appointment as per-
sonal representative of her husband's estate. Two weeks later, she
petitioned the Rocky Boy's Tribal Court for probate of the
estate. The state-tribal jurisdiction dispute was thus set in mo-
tion.
57. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. King County, 532 F.2d 655, 664 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1976).
58. American courts are not unique in their responsibility to weigh tribal interest.
See Note, Civil Rights: Indian Woman Denied Administration of Husband's Estate as the
Result of Ministerial Discretion, 8 OTTAWA L. REv. 662 (1976).
59. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-1-201 (1983).
60. 38 Mont. 1908, 631 P.2d 285 (1981).
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In violation of a state court order, the widow sold the grader to
her brother and the district court removed her as personal
representative. The new personal representative brought a civil
suit against the widow in state court for claim and delivery of the
grader, but the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the ac-
tion. Meanwhile, the tribal court declined jurisdiction over the
estate because the decedent was a member of another tribe. The
tribal court ceded probate jurisdiction to the state court.
The Montana Supreme Court assured the district court that it
had subject matter jurisdiction over both the claim and delivery
action and the probate proceedings. It reasoned that the state
court had jurisdiction since the claim and delivery action was
"the enforcement arm to recover property within the jurisdiction
of the probate court."6 Personal jurisdiction over the Indian
widow was based on her original election to be governed by state
law in applying for letters of representation from the district
court. The state supreme court concluded that the Iron Bear test
had been satisfied by the tribal court's dismissal of the probate
matter, wherein the tribal court expressly stated that jurisdiction
was in state court.
The supreme court limited its decision to jurisdiction over the
claim and delivery action; however, this limitation does not
minimize the impact of extension of state jurisdiction to probate
personalty located on a reservation. Strictly interpreted, Standing
Bear applies only to situations where out-of-state tribal members
are domiciled on reservations other than their own. In such in-
stances, state jurisdiction over Indian estates is analogous to state
jurisdiction over property located within state borders but owned
by a decedent domiciled out of state. Read more broadly, the
Standing Bear holding could be used to permit state court juris-
diction over all movables of any Indian who dies domiciled else-
where than on the reservation of which he is a tribal member.
Such an expansion of state jurisdiction over Indians living within
federal enclaves goes beyond the theory of jurisdiction by
default.
State and federal intrusions on tribal custom can be minimized
by proper assertion of jurisdiction and choice of law, but the
judicial intrusions are only part of the problem. Tribes may also
61. Id. at 1912, 631 P.2d at 289.
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suffer because of administrative delay while BIA agents deter-
mine whether trust property is included in decedent's estate, the
number of heirs of record, and the race of all possible heirs. 62
Mixed estates with both trust and nontrust property can trigger
disputes. State acceptance of and granting of full faith and credit
to tribal judgments may be tempered, and disputes involving non-
Indian beneficiaries are common. Where tribal codes instruct the
tribal judge to follow state law in intestacy situations, a common
law non-Indian spouse may take to the exclusion of the
decedent's half-blood children. Adopted children who fail to
meet tribal membership requirements and Indian named benefici-
aries from a tribe other than the decedent's may also present
problems. In Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee,63 a South Dakota fed-
eral district court held that children and grandchildren of a de-
ceased Yakima tribal member were precluded from inheritance
because they failed to meet the federal (not the tribal) minimum
blood requirement. Clearly, federal restrictions may be used as a
sword against inheritance by lineal descendants, as well as a
shield for tribal holdings. With BIA agents drafting, approving,
and witnessing Indian wills, there is also a real danger that dece-
dent's intent may be reflected only when it coincides with Bureau
standard practices.
Practitioner's Guide
An attorney with an Indian client must look to the laws of all
three forums: federal, tribal, and state."' In probate matters, he
62. 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.200-.282 (1983).
63. 244 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wash. 1965); 25 U.S.C.A. § 372 (1983).
64. Th6 following chart, adapted with substantial changes from CANBY, supra note
4, at 154, may be useful as a broad-brush illustration of Indian probate jurisdictional
choices.
Type Of Location Of
Decedent Domicile Property Property Jurisdiction
Indian on reservation real/personal anywhere federal
trust assets (exclusive)
real property off reservation state
(exclusive)
real property on reservation state/tribal
(concurrent)*
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must determine first the type and location of the estate's assets,
i.e., real or personal, trust or nontrust, located on or off the
reservation on the date of death.
Real Property
If real property is included in the estate, the first question is
always whether it is held in fee or in trust. If the Indian client is
seeking assistance in making a will, he should be able to provide
documentation regarding property held in fee. If the client is a
potential beneficiary, a visit or call to the County Clerk and
Recorder's Office should provide the answer. The agency
superintendent will have records of any real property held in
trust. Federal jurisdiction is exclusive as to the trust property,
and in such cases the administrative law judge's determination of
heirs is binding and final.6
Trust/Non Trust Property
If the estate includes nontrust as well as trust property, the
practitioner must decide whether to have the entire estate, in-
Type Of Location Of
Decedent Domicile Property Property Jurisdiction
personal on reservation tribal primary
property (concurrent
state)
off reservation all trust anywhere federal
assets (exclusive)
real property off reservation state
(exclusive)
real property on reservation state/tribal
(concurrent)








Non-Indian anywhere all assets off & on state
reservation (exclusive)
All designations of concurrent tribal jurisdiction are dependent on provisions in the
tribal code. All concurrent state designations are dependent upon tribal court refusal to
assert jurisdiction over members' property.
*With reservations regarding future development in light of Estate of Standing Bear v.
Belcourt, 38 Mont. 1908, 631 P.2d 285 (1981).
65. Crawford v. Andrus, 472 F. Supp. 853 (D. Mont. 1979).
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cluding the nontrust property, probated by the federal admin-
istrative law judge. The decedent's tribal code should be con-
sulted to determine whether the beneficiary would be likely to
suffer or benefit under tribal law: Are common law marriages
recognized by the tribe? Is there a minimum blood or tribal
membership requirement for heirship? How does the tribe's in-
testacy statute work? Is state law specified as the tribal judge's
only choice of law? Is there a mention of a family allowance?
Generally, tribal codes are not as well developed as state probate
law, but tribal law regarding marital and membership status is
critical to any decision in Indian probate law.
If tribal law seems to favor such beneficiaries as this client, but
the estate contains mixed property, the practitioner should next
consult the Code of Federal Regulations 66 to become familiar
with procedures regarding approval of wills and determination of
heirs. The attorney should contact the agency superintendent on
the decedent's reservation to find out how the pertinent federal
procedures are followed under the agency's supervision and
whether any unwritten or agency-specific policy exists, e.g.,
refusal to approve wills post-mortem.
Conclusion
Suggested Solutions
One remedy for many of these jurisdictional problems would
be exercise of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over all personal
and all nontrust property within the confines of the reservation.
Exclusive tribal court jurisdiction could apply to all on-
reservation property, regardless of Indian or non-Indian owner-
ship. State-reservation jurisdictional disputes could thus be
resolved by the same test used to resolve conflicts between states:
territorial borders, location of property (subject matter jurisdic-
tion), and domicile of decedent (personal jurisdiction). Indians
who chose to leave the reservation would be bound by state law,
just as out-of-state citizens moving to Oklahoma submit
themselves to Oklahoma law. Non-Indians residing on the reser-
vation would be subject to tribal law, just as Americans crossing
the northern border are subject to Canadian law.
This shift in Indian civil law would provide the opportunity to
implement the Merriam Report's suggestion that a revolving fund
66. 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.200-.282 (1983).
19821
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1982
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
be established to reacquire the lost tribal land base. If non-Indian
residents of a reservation preferred not to submit themselves or
their property to tribal court jurisdiction, then their on-
reservation property could be purchased on behalf of the tribe
and they could move from the federal enclave.
In the meantime, many of the jurisdictional problems in Indian
probate could be eliminated by assertion of tribal court jurisdic-
tion over Indian nontrust property. At a minimum, tribal probate
codes could be drafted or amended so as to apply to all nontrust
on-reservation property owned by tribal members. As more tribal
codes specify tribal court power to probate members' estates,
tribal judges will be less likely to cede that power to state courts.
Tribal interests and customs will be more likely to be protected if
estates are governed by tribal law.
Uniform Probate Code
The fifty United States share a two-hundred-year-old culture
that has permitted most Americans to share similar notions about
the transfer of property from generation to generation. In our
highly mobile society, the Uniform Probate Code is both prac-
tical and fair. With the 280 tribes, each with unique traditions,
customs, and differing problems and goals, the better approach
in Indian probate would be tribal self-government under in-
dividualized tribal codes. "[Tihe fundamental differences among
the tribes ... make a uniform Indian probate code an unrealistic
goal.
' '67
Particular Nature of Indian Probate Problems
Probate property must be categorized and consideration must
be given to the applicable law of each forum where jurisdiction
might be asserted. Advising Indian clients or potential benefici-
aries of Indian decedents is a complicated aspect of probate prac-
tice. The practitioner is left to find his way as best he can through
the jurisdictional maze engendered by the General Allotment Act.
Merely being involved in the research required prior to every In-
dian probate produces frustration. That frustration, however,
cannot equate to the feeling of Indian clients bound by a con-
queror's court and laws not their own, especially when those laws
conflict with their traditions. As is the case in so many areas of
Indian law, the Indian probate problem could be substantially re-
67. Trends and Problems in Probate, supra note 47, at 17-19.
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lieved by unfettered exercise of tribal sovereignty. If tribes were
permitted to determine their own membership and heirship re-
quirements and tribal courts enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over
persons and property located on the reservation, most probate
problems would be solved. Today's probate problems should cer-
tainly diminish as tribes exercise more of their inherent, sovereign
powers and as tribal courts become less reticent about exerting
previously unexercised, concurrent jurisdiction over members'
estates.
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